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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arises from the decision of the District Court granting summary judgment in
favor of Respondent, Medical Recovery Services, LLC., ("MRS") on issues of unjust enrichment,
conversion, and imposing a constructive trust on funds in possession of Appellant, Bonneville
Billing and Collections, Inc. ("BB&C"). MRS filed suit against BB&C to enforce its property right
in funds it had garnished from a third party, Stacie Christ ("Christ"). Christ's employer, Western
States Equipment Company, ("WSEC") accidentally mailed three garnishment checks intended
to go to MRS, by way ofthe Bonneville County Sheriff, to BB&C because of their proximity on a
computer drop down menu. Having spent considerable time and money to obtain the
judgment, writ of execution, continuing garnishment, and the funds accidentally in the
possession of BB&C, MRS sent a letter to BB&C explaining the situation and demanding the
return of the funds. BB&C refused to return the funds, and MRS filed a complaint for
conversion, unjust enrichment and imposition of a constructive trust.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

MRS submits the following in addition to the facts contained in BB&C's Brief. MRS
commenced a collection effort against Christ in April 2008.

1

MRS filed a complaint and
2

obtained a judgment against Christ on June 4, 2008 in the amount of $1,868.15. MRS obtained
an order for continuing garnishment against Christ's employer, WSEC.

3

MRS then paid

Bonneville County Sheriff to serve the writ of execution and notice of continuing garnishment
on WSEC on June 18, 2008.

1

R Vol. I, p. 035.

2

R Vol. I, p. 039.

3

R Vol. I, p. 043.
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On July 10, 2008, WSEC attempted to send the garnished proceeds to the Bonneville
County Sheriff but inadvertently selected as BB&C as payee rather than Bonneville County
4

Sheriff because of their close proximity on a pull-down computer menu. As a result of MRS'
continuing garnishment efforts and WSEC's pull down menu mistake, WSEC inadvertently sent
three checks totaling $1,083.21 to BB&C.

5

WSEC notified Bonneville County Sheriff Deputy

Sherie Bergren of the mistake and informed Deputy Bergren that WSEC had spoken with
BB&C's office manager Clayne Bodily ("Bodily") who refused to return the money.6 Deputy
Bergren sent a letter to counsel for MRS explaining the situation.

7

On August 21, 2008, MRS sent a demand letter to BB&C explaining the situation and
requesting that BB&C return the monies to WSEC to forward to the Bonneville County Sheriff to
comply with MRS' continuing garnishment.

8

On August 28, 2008, counsel for BB&C sent a letter

to MRS admitting BB&C had received the mistakenly sent funds and refusing to return the
funds to WSEC.

9

BB&C claimed it believed the funds were received due to a voluntary wage

assignment from two open accounts BB&C had against Christ.

lO

Bodily later testified that he

knew BB&C had not spoken with Christ or WSEC regarding a voluntary wage assignment.

ll

BB&C did not ever obtain a judgment in the case it had filed against Christ but dismissed the
case on August 29, 2008.

R Vol.
R Vol.
6 R Vol.
7 R Vol.
8 R Vol.
9 R Vol.
10 R Vol.
4

5

11

12

12

I, p. 064.
I, p. 071.
I, p. 064.
I, p. 064.
I, p. 066.
I, p. 069.
I, pp. 055-58.

R Vol. I, pp. 055-58.
Appellant's Brief at page

2..
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On September 28,2008, MRS filed a Complaint for conversion, unjust enrichment and a
constructive trust against BB&C.

13

The magistrate court entered judgment against MRS and

MRS filed an appeal with the District Court.

14

The District Court Judge reversed the magistrate

court on all issues and entered summary judgment in favor of MRS on the issues of unjust
enrichment, conversion, imposed a constructive trust on the disputed funds, vacated the award
of attorney's fees in favor of BB&C, ordered BB&C to return the attorney's fees it had obtained
from MRS, and remanded the case for a determination of a reasonable pre-appeal attorney fee
award to MRS.is
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT

1.

Is MRS entitled to an award of its attorney's fees and costs on appeal under

Idaho Code Section 12-120{1}, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41?
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT

I.
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION GRANTING MRS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM FOR CONVERSION.
A.

Standard Of Review.
"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's standard of

review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion."
P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237 {2007}. [{This Court
exercises free review over the entire record that was before the district judge to determine

13
14

15

R Vol. I, p. 009.
R Vol. I, pp. 148 and 184.
R Vol. I, p. 241.
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whether either side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and reviews the inferences
drawn by the district judge to determine whether the record reasonably supports those
inferences./I P.O. Ventures, 144 Idaho at 237. "[F]indings of fact based on substantial and
competent, albeit conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Nicholls v. Blaser, 102
Idaho 559, 562 (1981). Issues of law are freely reviewed by appellate courts. Neider v. Shaw,
138 Idaho 503,506 (2003).
B.

MRS Has A Right To Stacie Christ's Garnished Wages Superior To Any Right of BB&C.
Central to the Court's analysis is whether MRS had any property right in the proceeds

BB&C received. If MRS has a property right greater than BB&C's property right, then the Court
should determine that BB&C converted MRS' property for the undisputed value of the
property. For the reasons set forth below, the writ of garnishment MRS served upon WSEC
against Christ's wages created in MRS a property right in the garnished wages superior to any
property right in BB&C.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "an attachment, duly and regularly issued and
levied, becomes a lien on the property . . ..

/1

Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Runkel, 16 Idaho 192, 101

P. 396, 398 (1909) (emphasis added); see also Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco v. Smith,
42 Idaho 224, 244 P. 1102, 1103 (1926) ("The plaintiff in the attachment action obtained a lien
upon the pledged property in the hands of the pledgee bank by virtue of the garnishment
proceedings./I) Furthermore, "[g]arnishment ... is the process by which the garnishee is
brought into court, and also that by which the defendant's credit or property is attached in the
garnishee's hands. Its service is constructive seizure by notice. It is attachment in the hands of
a third person./I Eagleson v. Rubin, 16 Idaho 92, 100 P. 765, 767 (1909) (emphasis added).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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Additionally, "[u]pon the levy of a writ of attachment the property attached is in the custody of

the law, held to meet and pay any judgment which the attaching creditor may recover and
possession of the attached property vests in the officer until the property is disposed of." Letz
V.

Letz, 215 P.2d 534, 538 {Mont. 1950} {emphasis added}. "A sheriff serving a writ of

attachment is an officer of the court ... [and] [h]e is the agent of the attaching creditor and the
attached property in the custody of the sheriff is constructively in the possession of the

attaching creditor." Bass v. Stodd, 357 F.2d 458, 464 {9th Cir. 1966} {emphasis added}. Lastly,
the attaching creditor's lien becomes "perfected as of the date of service of the paperwork on

the garnishee by the sheriff." In re Aughenbaugh, 2002 WL 33939738, 4 {Bkrtcy.D.ldaho}
2002{emphasis added}; see also Kaesemeyer v. Smith, 22 Idaho 1, 123 P. 943, 948 {1912} nT]he
garnishment of the bank before such check has been presented creates a lien on the deposit
superior to that of the payee of the check."}
As the attaching creditor and by virtue of the Bonneville County Sheriff acting as its
"agent," MRS received a perfected lien upon the wages of Stacie Christ on June 18, 2008, the
date that MRS' agent {the Bonneville County Sheriff} served the writ of execution on WSEC. As
of this date, MRS' agent had "constructively seized" the wages, or property, of Stacie Christ that
WSEC held, and those wages were then in the "legal custody" and "constructive possession" of
MRS' agent, being held "to pay and meet" MRS' judgment. Moreover, MRS' lien upon the
wages was "superior" to any property interest BB&C may have, as BB&C did not have any
property interest in the wages-not a lien and not even any right of possession having come
into possession only by accident and only after MRS perfected its lien.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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BB&C did not have a judgment for the assigned debt it claimed to have against Christ on
the dates that WSEC sent the checks to BB&C. BB&C's manager, Clayne Bodily, admitted that
although it believed that the funds had been sent as a voluntary wage assignment, BB&C had
not had any conversations with WSEC or Christ regarding any such wage assignment and did
not have a judgment at the time BB&C received the checks. 16 Therefore, there can be no
question that Christ could have demanded that BB&C return his property as he would have an
interest in the property greater than BB&C who could not have garnished the funds without a
judgment. MRS' interest in the property was undeniably greater than any interest Christ had as
MRS had taken the appropriate steps to attach his wages. Thus, it logically follows that MRS'
interest in the misdelivered checks was greater than any rights BB&C could have had.
C.

The District Court Was Correct In Ruling That A Lien On Property Is A Convertible
Interest And That BB&C Converted MRS' Property.
This Court has stated:
"Conversion is any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's
personal property in denial or inconsistent with his rights therein, such as a tortuous
taking of another's chattels, or any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority,

personally or by procurement, over another's goods, depriving him of the possession,
permanently or for an indefinite time. The act must be essentially tortuous, but it is not
essential to conversion sufficient to support the action of trover that the defendant
should have complete manucaption of the property, or that he apply the property to his
own use, if he has exercised dominion over it, in exclusion of, in defiance of, or
inconsistent with the owner's right."
"In other words, conversion is a dealing by a person with chattels not belonging

to him, in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the owner./I
Schlie//v. Bistline, 52 Idaho 353, P.2d 726, 728 {1932} {emphasis added}.

16

R Vol. I, pp. 055-58.
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"A right of action accrues in favor of the owner of property as soon as the property is

wrongfully taken from his possession or wrongfully converted." Peasley Transfer & Storage
Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743 (1999). Furthermore, intent is not a necessary element of
conversion, rather only a positive act of dominion over another's property is all that is required.

Id. "An actor may be liable where he has in fact exercised dominion or control, although he
may be quite unaware of existence of rights with which he interferes, and a defendant's
intention, good or bad faith, and his knowledge or mistake are immaterial." Id. (emphasis
added). "[N]o evidence of a conversion exists until there is proof, first, that a proper demand
for possession was made by the one who is entitled thereto and, second, that the possessor
wrongfully refused delivery." Id.
Neither title nor possession is required to support a claim of conversion. "A plaintiff in a
conversion action must establish that he had title to the property or had the right to possess

the property at the time of the conversion/' Western Idaho Production Credit Ass'n v. Simplot
Feed Lots, Inc., 106 Idaho 260, 678 P.2d 52 (1984)(emphasis added).
Courts outside of Idaho have been even more specific in stating that a lien meets the
"right to possess" requirement and supports a claim of conversion. In this regard,
"[o]wnership" is a flexible term and includes a range of interests including proprietary interest
and mere possessory rights:
[A]ny person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer
or withholder/' a definition used for purposes of larceny, robbery and related offenses.
Our case law further acknowledges that "[t]he term owner is one of general application
and includes one having an interest other than the full legal and beneficial title .... The
word owner is one of flexible meaning, and it varies from an absolute proprietary
interest to a mere possessory right .... It is not a technical term and, thus, is not confined
to a person who has the absolute right in a chattel, but also applies to a person who has
possession and control thereof. (Internal quotation marks omitted)
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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Payne v. TK Auto Wholesalers, 98 Conn.App. 533, 911 A.2d 747, 752 {2006}.
In U.s. v. Haviland Agricultural Chemical Company, 489 F.Supp. 42 {W.O. Michigan,
1980L a debtor sold farm machinery securing a loan from plaintiff, an agency of the United
States Government. The debtor then used the money to pay another creditor, the defendant,
who refused to return the money. The court allowed that the refusal could meet the
requirements of conversion stating:
"An action for conversion has been stated by the plaintiff, specifically as
follows:~ 10. On or about January 26, 1974 the aforesaid Irving Salow turned over
$1,706.94 of the sale proceeds unlawfully to the defendant. Thereby defendant
converted to its own use property belonging to plaintiff... this Court concludes that the
lien interest, whether perfected or not, is a property interest ... "
(/d. at 43).

A lien constitutes a sufficient interest in personal property to support a conversion
claim. Imperial Valley L. Co. v. Globe G. & M. Co., 187 Cal. 352, 353-54, 202 P. 129 {1921}. A
third party may be liable for conversion where the third party interferes with a lienholder's
right in the property. Hartford Financial Corp. v. Burns, 96 Cal.App.3d 591, 158 Cal.Rptr. 169
{1979}. "A mere contractual right is not sufficient for conversion, but a lien is." Farmers Ins.
Exchange v. Zerin, 53 Cal. App. 4th 445, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 707 {1997}. See also Case Corp. v.
Gehrke, 208 Ariz. 140,91 P.3d 362 {App. 2004} {A retailer's use of sale proceeds gave rise to a
viable conversion claim because the lienholder had a security interest in such proceeds.}
"[P]roperty interest may be shown by a possession or a present right to possession when the
defendant cannot show a better right. .." Buck v. Gillham, 80 Ark. App. 375,96 S.W.3d 750 {Ct.
App. 2003} {emphasis added}.
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In Tzovolos v. Wiseman, 51 Conn. Supp. 532 (2007) (afl'd in 300 Conn. 247, 12 A.3d 563
(2011), the court ruled that defendants had converted a lender's security interest in property
when they took restaurant equipment. Id. at 569. The lender on the equipment had a
perfected purchase money security interest. Id. The defendants took the equipment to satisfy
the debt borrower owed them, and refused to return the property even after a verbal demand
notifying them of the higher priority lien. Id. at 569-70. Furthermore, defendants told the
lender that if he sought to recover the property, the legal fees would cost more than the
property was worth. Id. at 571.
That court ruled that U[a]lthough proof of absolute and unqualified title is ... sufficient,
proof of an immediate right to possession at the time of conversion is a/l that is required in
the way of title or possession to enable the plaintiff to recover./I Id. at 568. (emphasis added).
BB&C is analogous to the defendants in Tzovolos because BB&C too refused to return
the property after demand. MRS sent a demand letter to BB&C explaining that BB&C received
MRS' garnished proceeds and demanding that it return the $1,083.21 to WSEC within ten days.
In response, BB&C sent a letter to MRS stating that it had received the garnished proceeds and
that it refused to return the $1,083.21 to WSEC. It is BB&C's exercise of dominion and control
over the money belonging to MRS inconsistent with MRS' rights after MRS put BB&C on notice
that makes BB&C's conduct a wrongful conversion.
By virtue of its lien, MRS has established better ownership to the garnished wages than
BB&C. MRS has shown a present right to possession, and BB&C has exercised wrongful
dominion over the property right in denial or derogation of and inconsistent with the superior
right of MRS.
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D.

The District Court Was Correct When It Held That BB&C Converted MRS' Property Right
Because MRS' Property Right Did Not Terminate When The Checks Were Misdelivered.
BB&C argues that MRS has no property rights in the actual checks WSEC wrote to BB&C

even if MRS had a lien/property right in the actual garnished wages. In this regard, MRS has
already established that it has an interest in Christ's wages from the time that they were in the
hands of the WSEC. BB&C argues that Christ's garnished wages are different and separate from
the WSEC checks WSEC sent to BB&C. According to BB&C, although MRS may have had a
property right in Christ's wages, MRS had no property right in the WSEC checks.
This is like claiming that Jack stole Mike's car but did not convert Jill's cell phone that Jill
left in Mike's car-after all, Jack stole Mike's car, not Jill's cell phone. However, once Jack
knows Jill's cell phone was in the car, does not return it, and exercises dominion and control
over it, then Jack converted Jill's cell phone too. The car was simply a vehicle for transporting
Jill's cell phone. Similarly, WSEC's check was simply a vehicle for transporting Christ's funds
against which MRS had a lien.
BB&C incorrectly claims that only WSEC has a right to demand return of the checks. In

Gissel v. State, 111 Idaho 725 (1986), the state seized and sold wild rice that the plaintiffs
harvested on state and federal lands. Id. at 726. The plaintiffs sought to recover the portion of
funds pertaining to the rice harvested on the federal lands. Id. The state argued that the
plaintiffs, as trespassers on the federal land, could not have acquired title to any portion of the
rice. Id. at 727. In essence, the state was claiming that only the federal government could
claim right to the funds pertaining to the rice harvested on the federal lands. The Idaho
Supreme Court disagreed stating that "[o]ne who is otherwise liable to another for harm to or
interference with land or chattel is not relieved of the liability because a third person has a
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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legally protected interest in the land or chattel superior to that of the other." Gissel v. State,
lllldaho 725 (1986). In other words, as prior possessors of the rice, the plaintiffs had a better
right to possession of the proceeds than the state; therefore, the state was not relieved of its
liability for conversion just because the forest service had a superior right to the plaintiffs.
Here, just like the state in Gissel could not defend against a claim for conversion arguing
that the federal government had a right to the funds the plaintiffs sought, BB&C cannot defend
against MRS' claim for conversion arguing that WSEC has a right to the funds MRS seeks. BB&C
is liable for conversion because it does not have an interest superior to MRS' interest in the
funds, regardless of whatever claim WSEC may have to the funds.
Couched in other terms, the state in Gissel claimed that only the true owner, the forest
service, should be able to claim the funds. Identically, BB&C claims that even if MRS has an
interest, only WSEC should be able to claim the funds as the true owner of the funds. However,
BB&C's only interest is mere possession that BB&C obtained subject to MRS' prior lien. And
BB&C fails to offer any explanation how its mere possessory interest is superior to MRS' prior
lien. Therefore, BB&C's possessory interest is subject to both MRS and WSEC' interests, and the
priority between MRS and WSEC is irrelevant in this matter.
BB&C cites Eagleson v. Rubin, 16 Idaho 92 (1909) for the proposition that the
garnishment failed when WSEC mistakenly sent the garnished funds to BB&C. This is an
inaccurate reading, and Eagleson actually supports MRS' position. Eagleson stands for the
propositions that (1) personal property must be garnished by manual delivery or taking it into
custody; and (2) attachment occurs {{in the garnishee's hands./I Id. at 100. BB&C appears to
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claim that because Christ's wages left WSEC's possession, the garnishment somehow failed.
But under Eagleson, Christ's wages were garnished once WSEC had possession of them.
Moreover, Eagleson does not say nor does BB&C offer any case that says a garnishment
fails due to a mistake of the garnishee after the garnishee takes possession. If BB&C is claiming
that the garnishment failed because MRS did not take manual delivery or take custody, BB&C is
also mistaken. The manual delivery or custody required in Eagleson occurred when WSEC
withheld the money from Christ's paycheck and took possession. MRS' interest attached at
that time before BB&C ever came into possession.
BB&C claims that a lien is neither absolute nor an irrevocable transfer of debtor's rights.
Assuming this is true, MRS still has a better right than BB&C to the funds because BB&C has no

claim other than mere possession subject to MRS' lien. The cases BB&C attempts to distinguish
allow for lien attachment in the hands of the garnishee and make no provision for lien
cancellation. Nor does BB&C describe or cite authority for how MRS' lien was extinguished
after creation.
BB&C relies on the bankruptcy case In re Loren v. Ducommun, 159 B.R. 919 {Bkrtcy, D.
Idaho 1993} for the proposition that MRS' lien was terminated when the property was
mistakenly sent to BB&C rather than the Bonneville County Sheriff. In that case, the debtor
filed bankruptcy about 30 days after the garnishment was sent and the employer in accordance
with the bankruptcy stay paid the debtor his wages and the bankruptcy court held that the
creditor could not garnish the future wages of the debtor because of the bankruptcy stay. The
District Court in this case correctly distinguished In re Loren by pointing out that the case In re
Loren relied upon, American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Walmstad, 44 Idaho 786, 260 P. 168 {1927}:
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"dealt exclusively with garnishment of personal property capable of manual
delivery-potato sacks in that case .... ln this case, MRS levied on the future earnings of
Ms. Christ. When BCS served the Writ, those future earnings were not capable of
manual delivery and could not be attached by taking them into custody. Thus,
attachment occurred pursuant to Idaho Code § 8-506(5). BCS left the writ with WSEC
and gave notice that wages payable to Ms. Christ were attached pursuant to the Writ.
In other words, when a "continuing garnishment" is in effect, attachment is a
"continuing" process. As Ms. Christ earned wages, WSEC became obligated to pay her,
and MRS obtained a lien on that debt."17
The District Court further reasoned that "the levying officer, BCS, [Bonneville County Sheriff]
did not need to 'take' possession of anything in order to create a lien.

18

It would make no sense

to hold that BCS needed to 'maintain' possession of anything to preserve the lien." Thus, MRS
had a property right greater than any right BB&C could have had in the garnished funds.
Although the language of In re Loren arguably states that possession is necessary for the
continued existence of a lien on property, MRS invites the court to decline to follow that
decision on several grounds. First, In re Loren, dealt with a judgment creditor seeking an
automatic bankruptcy stay to garnish the future wages of the judgment debtor. The Idaho
Supreme Court has restated one of two main goals of bankruptcy law as "giving the individual
debtor a fresh start, by giving him a discharge of most of his debts." Christian v. Mason, 148
Idaho 149, 153,219 P.3d 473, 477 (2009). Additionally, "[e]xceptions to discharge must be
strictly construed against the creditor, and liberally construed in the debtor's favor, in order to
afford the debtor a fresh start." Howard v. Moore, 580 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
Thus, in accord with the main goal of bankruptcy law, the court in In re Loren, had to liberally
construe the facts and law in favor ofthe debtor in that case, meaning the court was searching
for a way to provide the debtor relief and a fresh start.

17

R Vol. I, p. 251.
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Second, the court in In re Loren did not cite to any case law explaining how an already
perfected lien could be extinguished upon transfer of property. The case that the In re Loren
court relied upon, American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Walmstad, 44 Idaho 786, 260 P. 168 (1927),
dealt with attachment of personal property capable of manual delivery which by statute
requires that "[p]ersonal property capable of manual delivery must be attached by taking it into
custody." I.C §8-506(3). The In re Loren court did not cite to any law concerning the
attachment of property not capable of manual delivery. I.C § 8-506(5) deals with personal
property not capable of manual deliver and states:
Debts and credits and other personal property not capable of manual delivery
must be attached by leaving with the person owing such debts, or having in his
possession or under his control such credits or other personal property, or with his
agent, a copy of the writ, and a notice that the debts owing by him to the defendant, or
the credits or other personal property in his possession or under his control, belonging
to the defendants, are attached in pursuance of such writ.

I.C § 8-506(5). As explained above, a lien on personal property not capable of manual delivery
is "perfected as of the date of service of the paperwork on the garnishee by the sheriff." In re
Aughenbaugh, 2002 WL 33939738,4 (Bkrtcy.D.ldaho) 2002{emphasis added). Thus, the district
court's analysis and resulting decision to decline to follow In re Loren, was correct because In re
Loren applied improper law in reaching its conclusion.
Finally, this court should decline to follow In re Loren because that decision fails to
explain how the already perfected lien failed to follow the property when it was transferred.
The United States Supreme Court and various state courts have long held that "[I]t is of the very
nature and essence of a lien, that no matter into whose hands the property goes, it passes cum
onere.' Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(quoting United
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57, 78 S.Ct. 1054, 1058, 2 L.Ed.2d 1135 (1958)). Thus, it logically
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follows that because MRS' lien on the garnished funds was already perfected, accidental
transfer of the garnished funds did not extinguish the lien but that the lien necessarily followed
the property. The negative policy implications of following In re Loren would be great. For
example, if the In re Loren decision is extended, any garnishee could "accidentally" transfer the
garnished funds to a third party such as a friend or relative to prevent a rightful creditor from
obtaining such property. If the garnishee is insolvent or files bankruptcy, the creditor would
have no means of recovering its rightful property.
E.

The District Court Was Correct When It Determined that MRS May Pursue Its Equitable
Remedies Against BB&e.
BB&C argues that Idaho's garnishment statutes are controlling in this case and that MRS

must seek recourse from WSEC and has no remedy against BB&e. MRS disagrees that it may
not seek recourse against BB&C for conversion of MRS property interest. BB&C cites to several
Idaho garnishment statutes and case law regarding the interpretation of statutes but does not
cite to a single statute or case that stands for the premise that a party may not seek recourse
against a third party tortfeasor who interferes with its garnishment proceedings. BBe's reading
that the remedy allowed under the garnishment statutes is MRS' sole remedy requires
statutory construction that needlessly expands the clear language of the statute. The clear
intent of the garnishment statutes is to allow recovery from WSEC for its failure to comply with
the writ, not to make a garnishee liable for the actions of an intervening tortfeasor like BBe.
The garnishment statutes control garnishment proceedings but do not state or imply that MRS
has a remedy only against WSEC and may not seek other available remedies against third party
tortfeasors.
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BB&C's argument that the garnishment statutes limit a creditor's remedy to recover
against third party tortfeasors would create considerable policy problems in this area of the law
and does not comport with common sense. For example, assume the Sheriff's office received
the garnishment checks and then a deputy within that office embezzled those funds. BB&C's
position is that MRS' only remedy is against WSEC because of the garnishment statues. This
would limit MRS remedy to seeking recourse against WSEC who fully complied with those
statutes while allowing the embezzling deputy to retain the embezzled funds. Or a garnishee
could file bankruptcy leaving a creditor in MRS' shoes without a remedy. Because the District
Court was correct in its conclusion that "MRS is not precluded [by the garnishment statutes]
from asserting its equitable claims of unjust enrichment and constructive trust/' this Court
should affirm the decision of the District Court on this issue.
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT BB&C WAS UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY
RETAINING THE BENEFIT CREATED BY MRS' GARNISHMENT EFFORTS.
A.

BB&C Has Been Unjustly Enriched Without Payment To MRS For the Value Of MRS
Services In Causing The Funds To Be Garnished.
Unjust enrichment "allows recovery where the defendant has received a benefit from the

plaintiff that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain without compensating the
plaintiff for the value of the benefit." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153, 1161
(2009). In order to establish a prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must
establish that three elements exist: "(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without
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payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133
Idaho 82,88 (1999). See also Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923, 927 (Ohio 1938) ("Unjust
enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and
equity belong to another.").
Here, MRS (1) conferred a benefit upon BB&C by filing suit, obtaining judgment, and
garnishing wages from Stacie Christ on whom BB&C had a collection account and from whose
employer BB&C serendipitously received three checks in the amount of $1,083.21-all without
having to lift a finger; (2) BB&C has "appreciated" the benefit because BB&C has accepted and
retained the money from the three checks; and (3) BB&C has accepted the checks under
circumstances that would be inequitable for BB&C to retain them without payment to MRS for
their value because the money is a windfall for BB&C to the detriment of MRS who is still
uncompensated for the effort, cost and expense of obtaining the funds.
In Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc.,1l7 Idaho 591 (Ct. App. 1989),
Chinchurreta obtained a judgment against a derelict nursing home operator. Id at 592. The
nursing home also owed money to the Christensens. In the operator's absence, the
Christensens paid $40,000 out of pocket to run the nursing home during January 1988 for which
the state paid $24,000 to the facility. Id. at 593. The lender attached the January money to
satisfy his judgment, and the Christensens contested. Id.
The court held that the Christensens had an equitable right to the funds because they
had operated the facility during January. Id. Rather than releasing the attached funds to
Chinchurreta, the district judge set up a constructive trust, recognizing legal title to the funds in
the nursing home operator, but granting an equitable title to the Christensens. Id. The court
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held that Chinchurreta had no claim to the funds except through the nursing home operator,
who, in turn, had no claim to the funds because he had performed none of the services and
made none of the expenditures that led to the $24,000 payment from the state. Id. at 594. The
appellate court summarized "The services for which the money has been disbursed were
performed by the Christensens. The district court determined that releasing the January money
to Chinchurreta rather than to them would create an unjust enrichment. The constructive trust
was imposed upon the funds in order to prevent this result. We find no error." Id.
Just as the Christensen's paid for the nursing home operations for January 1988, MRS
incurred out of pocket costs for filing fees, service fees, sheriff's fees and legal fees to secure
the garnishment. Just as the payment from the state came only due to the Christensen's
expenditures, there would have been no garnishment here without MRS' expenditures. Just as
the court created a constructive trust in favor of the Christensens, this Court should create a
constructive trust here in favor of MRS. But for MRS' effort, there would have been no
disbursement. Therefore, BB&C received a benefit from MRS and is unjustly enriched by
retaining the wages, and a constructive trust should be created in favor of MRS. Until BB&C
pays for the value of the benefit, it has been unjustly enriched to MRS' detriment.
BB&C makes no effort to discuss the case of Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management,
Inc., 117 Idaho 591 (Ct.App. 1989) that MRS cited in its appellate brief to the District Court
regarding unjust enrichment. Instead, BB&C just challenges the source conferring the benefit
on BB&C claiming that WSEC, rather than MRS, conferred the benefit. BB&C's "classic law
school analogy" of A contracting with B to paint B's house and then mistakenly painting C's
house is severely flawed because in the analogy, B provided no benefit to C whereas if MRS had
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not spent money to hire an attorney, obtain a judgment, obtain a writ of execution and
continuous garnishment, WSEC would not have sent the checks that BB&C ultimately obtained.
Because of MRS' work acquiring and executing on the judgment, BB&C received Christ's money
without having to do any of the work necessary for a judgment and execution. All WSEC did
was to mistakenly send the funds resulting from MRS' labors to BB&C. BB&C fails to explain
how the benefit would have been conferred without MRS' effort.
The District Court correctly held:

"[t]he position taken by BB&C implicitly and erroneously assumes the funds it
received were WSEC funds. Nothing in the record indicates that WSEC owed any money
to BB&C. Once Ms. Christ earned the disputed funds, WSEC became obligated to pay
her. WSEC was not free to give Ms. Christ;s money to whomever it chose. The record
does not show that Ms. Christ ever instructed WSEC to send her money to BB&C. The
Writ superseded, in part, WSEC's obligation to Ms. Christ for her labor and created the
obligation to instead deliver $1,083.21 of her earnings to MRS. Absent the Writ
procured by MRS, therefore, the disputed funds would have been delivered to Ms.
Christ and would not have been sent to BB&C.,,19
B.

BB&C'S Violation Of Idaho Code Section 18-2403 Further Supports The Conclusion That
MRS Has Unjustly Enriched BB&C.
In relevant part, Idaho Code Section 18-2403 states:

(1) A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive
another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.
(2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's
property, with the intent prescribed in subsection {1} of this section, committed in any

of the following ways:
{a} By deception obtains or exerts control over property of the owner;
{b} By conduct heretofore defined or know as larceny; common law
larceny by trick; embezzlement; extortion; obtaining property, money or labor
under false presentences; or receiving stolen goods;
(c ) By acquiring lost property. A person acquires lost property when he
exercises control over property of another which he knows to have been lost or
mislaid, or to have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the

19
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recipient or the nature or amount of the property, without taking reasonable
measures to return such property to the owner; or a person commits theft of
lost or mislaid property when he:
1. Knows or learns the identity of the owner or knows, or is aware
of, or learns of a reasonable method of identifying the owner; and
2. Fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to
the owner; and
3. Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or
benefit of the property.
Idaho Code § 18-2403 {emphasis added.}
Idaho Code § 18-2402{6} defines owner as "any person who has a right to possession
thereof superior to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder." Idaho Code §§ 18-2407 and 182408 make theft of property with a value in excess of one thousand dollars {S1,OOO} felony
grand theft. In discussing §18-2403, one Idaho court has explained the following:
It is well established at common law that one who finds and appropriates lost
property acquires a complete right thereto against all the world except the true owner.
In general, the character of the thing found does not affect the property rights of the
finder. However, should the finder know or have reasonable means of discovering the
true owner, he must do so or he may be guilty of larceny.

***
Idaho criminal law embodies this principle, providing that a person may be held
criminally liable for theft "when he exercises control over property of another which he
knows to have been lost or mislaid ... without taking reasonable measures to return the
property to the owner." I.e. § 18-2403{2}{c}{Emphasis added}.

State v. Evans, 119 Idaho 383, 386 {Ct. App. 1991}{lnternal Citations Omitted.}
Idaho Code makes the obtaining and withholding of another's property, with a value in
excess of a thousand dollars, grand theft when the property has "been delivered under a
mistake as to the identity of the recipient" and the party thereafter "learns the identity of the
owner." Idaho Code § 18-2403 is nearly identical to theft provisions of several other states,
which have held that parties who received funds as a result of mistaken delivery are guilty of
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theft. See Cora v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 431, 319 S.W3d 281 (Ark. App. 2009).
In Cora, a finance company mistakenly sent a payment to a boat dealer in behalf of a
purchaser who had already obtained other financing and used that other financing to pay for
the boat. The boat dealer did not know of the overpayment and used the mistakenly sent funds
to pay expenses learning only later that it had received the mistaken payment. When the boat
dealer could not repay the amount it had mistakenly received, the state charged and convicted
the boat dealer of theft under a statute nearly identical to Idaho Code § 18-2403(2)(c).
Here, the same result follows. Stacie Christ's employer mistakenly sent the garnishment
checks to "Bonneville Billing and Collections" instead of "Bonneville County Sheriff." MRS is an
"owner" because MRS' rights to the mistakenly delivered money are superior to BB&C who
merely possesses the mistakenly delivered funds. See Idaho Code § 18-2402(6) (which defines
owner as "any person who has a right to possession thereof superior to that of the taker,
obtainer or withholder").
As soon as BB&C learned the identity of MRS as the "owner" of the funds, exercised
dominion and control over the funds, and refused to return the funds, BB&C committed felony
grand theft under Idaho Code § 18-2403. This wrongful act amounts to grand theft under Idaho
law. See Idaho Code §§ 18-2407 and 18-2408. Even if the Bonneville County Sheriff or WSEC
were the true owner and not MRS, the conduct amounting to grand theft against the Bonneville
County Sheriff, WSEC or MRS necessarily makes that conduct at least unjust enrichment, if not
conversion.
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C.

BB&C'S Argument That MRS Has Failed To Mitigate Its Damages Is Incorrect Because
Idaho's Garnishment Statutes Prevented MRS From Garnishing More Than The Amount
Of Its Judgment.
BB&C argues that MRS could have mitigated its damages by simply continuing its

garnishment of Christ's wages until it had received the full amount of its judgment thereby
recovering the amount BB&C converted. BB&C argues that U[i]f MRS had continued its
continuing garnishment rather than discontinuing it in order to pursue this litigation, then MRS
would have received the equivalent amount that BB&C received from WSEC by October 2008
and this matter would be moot. In other words, BB&C argues that MRS had to over garnish
Christ or MRS has no claim against BB&C. This argument also has no bearing on whether MRS
had a valid property interest and whether BB&C converted that property interest.
Under applicable Idaho law, U[t]he creditor shall be solely responsible for insuring that
the amounts garnished do not exceed the amount due on the judgment." Idaho Code § 8509(b). The statute places the burden on the creditor to cease the garnishment when the
amount of the judgment has been garnished.
Here, MRS garnished $1,822.41 from Christ's wages on a judgment of $1,868.15. Rather
than run afoul of the law and incur potential liability for garnishing an amount that would
"exceed the amount due on the judgment," MRS recalled the garnishment. For some reason
that BB&C fails to explain, BB&C thinks that MRS should have allowed the garnishment to
continue until MRS got paid its judgment amount even though continuing the garnishment
would have exceeded the amount due on the judgment. BB&C's reading of the statute would
have denied Christ due process for contesting BB&C's claims. Moreover, BB&C's reading of the
statute would have cause MRS to violate Idaho law.
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III.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST SHOULD BE
IMPOSED ON THE DISPUTED FUNDS IN FAVOR OF MRS.
"A constructive trust is a remedial device created primarily to prevent unjust
enrichment; equity compels the restoration to another of property to which the holder thereof
is not justly entitled ... A constructive trust may be imposed in practically any case where there
is a wrongful acquisition or detention of property to which another is entitled." Chinchurreta v.
Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 790 P.2d 372 (Ct. App. 1989}{emphasis added).
In Chinchurretta the court held that a constructive trust existed where the result of
enforcement of the attachment would be unjust enrichment. Chinchurreta v. Evergreen, 117
Idaho 591. The court held that a trust existed such that the nursing home operator had legal
title and the Christensens had equitable title. Id. at 594. Because BB&C is unjustly enriched in
retaining the garnished wages, the court should hold that MRS holds equitable title to the
wages.
BB&C cites Iron Eagle Development LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487
(2003) for the proposition that unjust enrichment and constructive trust are not available as
equitable claims when an adequate legal remedy is available. Thus, according to BB&C, MRS
cannot make equitable claims for unjust enrichment and constructive trust against BB&C
because MRS has a legal remedy against WSEC.
However, the rule BB&C relies on applies only where the same plaintiff makes a claim in
equity and also makes a legal claim against the same defendant. Id. at 492. Neither Iron Eagle
nor any other case prevents an equitable claim where a plaintiff has a legal claim against
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another distinct defendant. For example, in Iron Eagle an equitable remedy was not available
for the litigants because of "[a n] adequate legal remedy under ... express agreement" between
the parties. Id. In other words, a contract between the parties precluded equitable claims
between the same parties for relief.

In In re Boyd, 134 Idaho 669 (Ct.App. 2000), a defendant sought to preclude an
equitable claim on the grounds that an express contract existed between the plaintiff and
another party for the same contractual purpose, and therefore plaintiff had an adequate legal
remedy. In re Boyd at 673. The Idaho Court of Appeals was not persuaded stating "the express
contract and the implied-in-Iaw contract involved different parties. Where an express contract
exists, an implied contract between the same parties for the same contractual purpose is
precluded from enforcement. Such is not the case here." Id. Accordingly, even assuming MRS
had a legal claim against WSEC, such a claim would not preclude equitable relief against BB&C,
a separate and distinct party.
The District Court was correct in holding that pursuant to its holding regarding unjust
enrichment and conversion, a constructive trust should be imposed on the disputed funds in
favor of MRS.
IV.
THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER BB&C TO RETURN THE ATTORNEY'S FEES BB&C GARNISHED FROM
MRS ON THE REVERSED JUDGMENT.
An appellate court has authority to order a losing party on appeal to immediately return
all the money that party recovered on the judgment the appellate court reverses. BECD Const.
Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 149 Idaho 294 (2010). Here, the District Court reversed the

decision of the magistrate court and remanded the matter accordingly. The District Court
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properly ordered that BB&C immediately pay to MRS all money that BB&C garnished from MRS
in full satisfaction of the judgment the Magistrate Court wrongfully entered against MRS. In
this regard, BB&C garnished MRS and has received payment in full on the judgment.

v.
MRS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 allows an award of costs "as a matter of course to the prevailing
party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court./I I.A.R.40{a}. MRS is entitled to
attorneys fees and costs pursuant I.e. 12-120{1}, I.A.R. 40 and I.A.R 41 because MRS the matter
in dispute was less than $25,000, MRS demanded payment in writing from BB&C more than 10
days before filing suit, and MRS was entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs below.
Accordingly, MRS requests that as the prevailing party on appeal, this Court award its attorney's
fees and costs.
CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, MRS respectfully requests that {I} this Court affirm
the decision of the District Court granting summary judgment to MRS on the issue of
conversion; {2} affirm the decision of the District Court granting summary judgment to MRS on
the issue of unjust enrichment; {3} affirm the decision of the District Court imposing a
constructive trust in favor of MRS on the disputed funds currently held by BB&C; {4} affirm the
decision of the District Court ordering BB&C to immediately repay all amounts it garnished
MRS on the reversed judgment; and {5} award MRS attorney's fees and costs for on appeal.
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